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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WARDEBTSANDINFLATION
ABSTRAI
This paper argues that before World War II the desire to
maintain a trustworthy reputation for honoring war debts was an
important factor in inducing deflationary postwar monetary
policies in both the United Kingdom and the United States.The
paper then asks why this policy objectivedid not serve to induce
either a deflationary monetary policy or the honoring in fullof
war debts following World War II. The discussionfocuses on
differences in economic and political conditions atter World War
II, especially the extension of the voting franchise, trie
increased economic and political power of organized labor, and,
perhaps most importantly, the large postwar demands onnational
resources with which the servicing of World—War—Il debtshad to
compete. The analysis also argues that, becausethese postwar
developments were unforeseeable, but verifiable, contingencies,
the partial default on World—War—Il debts was excusable and,
accordingly, did not cause either the United Kingdom orthe




Providence, RI 02912Critical discussions of monetary policy, exemplified by the
classic research of Friedman & Schwartz (1963) as well as by the
more recent analysis by Taylor (1981, 1982), commonly regard
historical episodes of deflation and inflation to be policy
mistakes, and attribute these mistakes to idiosyncratic
perversity or stupidity of policymakers. These critics take the
fact that policymakers typically do not articulate coherent
explanations for their actions in terms of the maximizing
calculus of economic rationality as evidence that policy is not
based on correct economic analysis. A popular complementary line
of argument associates episodes of detlation and intlation with
shortcomings, not of particular policymakers, but of the
institutional arrangements for policymaking. For example, Toma
(1982, 1985) emphasizes perverse bureaucratic incentives, whereas
Kydland & Prescott (1977) and Barro & Gordon (1983) focus on the
inability of policymakers to commit themselves to resist the
temptation to try to produce unanticipated inflation.
Whether the focus is on individual or on institutional
shortcomings, this literature presumes that episodes of deflation
or inflation are indications of bad monetary policy. This
presumption has obvious plausibility because the negative
consequences associated with deflationary or inflationary
monetary policies are usually readily apparent. To counter the
presumption in any particular case that deflation or inflation
was bad policy, an economic historian must argue that the
consequences of deflationary or inflationary policies, however
undesirable, nevertheless were preterable to the consequences Ot
hypothetical alternative policies. Such as argument usually
would involve speculation about the objectives or policy or about
the actual constraints on the achievement of these objectives.—2—
The analysis that follows accepts this challenge.It bases
an account of postwar British and American episodes ot
deflationary and inflationary monetary policies on the opposite
presumption that qualitatively these historical events are
convincingly explicable as rational policy choices ——thatis, as
choices that maximized the actual objectives ot monetary policy
subject to the policymaker's perceived constraints. The
attraction of this research strategy is that it yields positive
propositions about the dependence of monetary policy on the
economic and political environment that can explicate past policy
actions and can help to predict the future evolution of policy.
The analysis focuses specifically on the conflicting
pressures on monetary policy resulting from the pervasive
objective of maintaining a reputation for honoring war debts and
from the other demands on national resources with which the
servicing of war debts has had to compete. The presumption that
postwar monetary policies have been qualitatively rational
responses to these contlicting pressures does not preclude
quantitative policy mistakes, but this presumption suggests that
any regrets about past policy actions reflect the accumulation or
information that was not available when policy was made and,
given that policymakers process available information
efficiently, that quantitative policy mistakes and regrets do not
have a systematic pattern.
1. Before World War II
In British and American history, as in the history of most
countries, the incurring of public debt has been associated
mainly with the financing of the temporarily high levels of
public expenditures associated with major wars. After major
wars, the ratio of public debt to annual GNP has declined,
reversing most if not all of its wartime increase, with minor—3—
wars and recessions causing only brief interruptions in this
process.1 Figures 1 and 2, taken from Barro's Macroeconomics,
summarize this history.
The United Kingdom and the United States, moreover, are
notable in having regularly issued debts that are nominally
denominated in the units of their own currencies. Such debts
involve promises to pay a fixed number of units of an asset whose
real value the sovereign debtor itself controls through its power
either to specify the commodity equivalent of a unit at currency
or to control the supply of fiat money. Presumably, a sovereign
can issue nominally denominated debt only if lenders believe trtat
the sovereign will not use its power to inflate in order to
repudiate its debts. In practice, before World War II, both the
UK and US always validated this belief, even to the extent ot
deflating in postwar periods following the issuance of large
quantities of debt.
The behavior of the US and UK price levels associated with
the French Wars, the American Civil War, and World War I
dramatically illustrates this pattern. See Table 1.In all four
of these cases, the price level peaked during either the war
itself or the period of postwar reconstruction, but then the
price level declined and, despite subsequent periods of inflation
and deflation, did not regain its peak until the next major war.
'Given this pattern, the history of the public debt in the UK and
the USA is broadly consistent with the tax—smoothing theory of
fiscal deficits. See Barro (September 1987, pp. 237—242) for the
UK evidence and additional references. The large fiscal deficits
in the US during the 1980's have been associated with major
investments in military hardware rather than with a major war.
This episode still could turn out to be consistent with the tax—
smoothing theory if subsequent experience shows that the 1980's
did not witness an increase in the permanent level of federal
government expenditures.—4—
Figure2 lehavior of the ritish Public Debt. 1700—1984
Source:Robert J. Barro, Macroeconomics Second Edit-Ion
(New York:Wiley,1987).
z
Figure1 Behavior of the U.S. Public Debt, 1790—1 985—5—
Table 1
Major Wars and Prices
War Price Level Subsequent Peak
Years Peaked Troughs Regained
US Civil War 1861—1865 1866 1879,1896 191b









UK WWI 1914—1918 1920 1934 1947
Data on price indexes from Mitchell &Deane(1962), Friedman &
Schwartz(1982), and U.S. Commerce Department (1975).
As a consequence of this behavior of the price level,
realized real rates of return on war debts before World War II
were always highly positive. See the upper section ot Table 2.
Throughout the pre—Worid—War—Il experience, the postwar decreases
in the debt to GNP ratio were attributable to a combination ot net
debt redemptions and real economic growth.
How can we explain this pattern of detlationary postwar
monetary policy and resulting positive real yields on war debts?
Monetary policy and debt—servicing policy attect in a variety or
ways the distribution of claims to national wealth and income.
Actual policy, accordingly, must contorm to the resolution ot
conflicting distributional interests that is achieved through the
political process. The rentiers are clearly the most direct
beneficiaries of deflation, and their spokespersons argue
understandably that sound monetary policies have broader effects—6—
Table 2
Yields on War Debts
Years of Issue Average Average
to Redemption Nominal Yield Real Yield
- ofRepresenta— to Redemption to Redemption
War Yearstive War Loan (% per annum) (% per annum)
UK War of Spanish
Succession 1702—1713 1708—1808 7.3
UK War of Austrian
Succession 1740—1748 1745—1845 3.4 3.0
UK Seven Years War 1756—1763 1759—1859 3.9 3.5
UK War of American
Independence 1775—1783 1779—1879 5.0 4.7
UK French Wars
(including
Napoleanic Wars) 1793—1815 1804—1855 5.1 5.3
UK World War I 1914—1918 1916—1943 5.7 2.4
US Civil War 1861—1865 1863—1872 5.7 3.3
US World War I 1917—1918 1917—1930 4.1
***a*
USWorld War II 1941—1945 1942—1963 2.5 —0.9
UK World War II 1939—1945 1942—1965 3.0 —0.8
Table entries computed from data on debt issues and nominal yields
in Homer (1963) and on price indexes in Mitchell & Deane (1962),
Friedman & Schwartz (1982), and U.S. Commerce Department (1975).
(Because of the complex terms of much of this war debt and the
complicated arrangements under which many of these loans were
eventually called or converted, the entries in Table 2 are only
approximations. Reasonable alternative calculations, however,
would suggest that average realized real rates ot return prior to
World War II were even higher.)—7—
that benetit all income claimants.2 Another, less obvious but
nevertheless important, aspect of distributional politics, which
we shall emphasize further below, is the intensity of concern
about the effects of deflationary monetary policy on aggregate
employment and aggregate economic activity.
Without denying the importance of distributional
considerations, given Britain's long history of recurring wars Qt
attrition against continental foes, it is easy to argue that a
central consideration influencing British postwar monetary policy
was the desire to maintain a trustworthy reputation for honoring
war debts, without which efficient financing of the next war would
not have been possible. Contemporary observers explicitly
recognized that Britain's credit was so valuable that it was in
the interest of British taxpayers to resist the temptation to
repudiate war debts, to acquiesce in postwar deflationary
policies, and to bear the resulting burden of servicing war
debts. In his discussion of the Napoleanic Wars, the French
historian Braudel writes:
The national debt was the major reason for the British
victory. It had placed huge sums of money at England's
disposal at the very moment when she required them.
Isaac de Pinto was clear—sighted when he wrote in 1771:
'The scrupulous and inviolable exactness with which this
interest [that on the national debt] has been paid, the
idea of parliamentary guarantees, have established
England's credit to the point where she has received
loans that have surprised and astonished the rest of
Europe.' He regarded the English victory in the Seven
Years' War (1756—1763) as the natural consequence.
France's weakness, he claimed, lay in her poor credit
arrangements. Thomas Mortimer was also right when in
1769 he admired in English public credit 'the permanent
miracle of her policy, which has inspired both
21n his comparative analysis of debt—servicing policy after World
War I, Alesina (1988) focuses on the political power of competing
income claimants. He attributes deflationary British monetary
policy ——whichhe contrasts with more inflationary policies in
Germany and France and a combination of inflation and forced
conversion of debt in Italy ——tothe political strength of
Britain's rentiers, in alliance with businessmen who naturally
opposed any threat to property rights.—8—
astonishment and fear in the states of Europe'. Thirty
years earlier, George Berkeley had celebratea it as 'the
chief advantage which England has over £rance'——Braude1
(1984), page 378.
Similarly, as Keynes wrote in 1916:
If we can go on giving the army what they want longer
than the Germans can do this to theirs, we may appear to
win by military prowess. But we shall really have won by
financial prowess ——quotedin Johnson (1971), page 187.
Interestingly, in the extensive British debate about monetary
policy after the First World War, the proponents of the return to
gold at the prewar parity do not seem to have spoken explicitly
about a possible need to finance another major war. The closest
that Churchill came to making this argument apparently were woros
such as the following from a 1925 speech:
We have not adopted any of those cheap and easy methods
by which to obtain a temporary glow of popularity by
failing to make ...fullprovision for the repayment ot
our debts... •Onecan quite easily see the many
temptations ...totry to tide over the difficulties of
the moment by failing to do bun duty to the
responsibilities of the future ——quotedin James
(1974), pages 3632—3633.
Perhaps this vague warning, in one of a series of speeches in
which Churchill mainly stressed alleged commercial advantages of
returning to gold, reflected Churchill's understandable reluctance
to acknowledge explicitly the horrible possibility, which all
thinking people must have feared, that the Great War had not
settled the issues that caused it and that the Armistice and
subsequent Treaty of Versailles were not viable, involving merely
an American imposed truce made possible by the temporary
exhaustion of the principal foes.3 As one writer who was willing
to express the unpleasant truth put it,
3wniting in 1920, Colonel Repington prophetically entitled his
memoirs, The First World War 1914—1918. According to Taylor
(1965, page 2), "Repington devised Ithis titleJ at the time of
the armistice to prevent the millenian folk from forgetting that
the history of the world is the history of warl"—9—
The present series of wars, it seems likely, will
continue for twenty or thirty years, and perhaps
longer. That the first clash was inconclusive was
shown brilliantly by the preposterous nature of the
peace finally reached ——apeace so artificial and
dishonest that the signing of it was almost equivalent
to a new declaration of war ——tlencken(1922, page
199).
Taylor (1965, page 228) reports that from 1919 until 1932 british
military planning was based on the optimistic presumption of "nc
major war within the next ten years".
It is also worth noting that by 1931 the MacMillan Committee
believed that the deflationary policy producing a positive return
on war debts had gone too tar. The Committee's Report spoke ot
"the immediate necessity to raise prices above their present
level" and stated in support of this recommendation that
The increase in the burden of internal War debts ensuing
on a rise in the value of gold money will present a most
difficult problem if incomes generally become adjusted to
the new lower level ...Afailure by the Central Banks of
the world to attempt to redress the fall of prices, in
our judgment, would endanger the principles on which
modern economic society is founded, namely, the
dependence of the productive process on the expectation
of normal profit to individual concerns, and the sanctity
of contract. For to allow prices to fall, whilst social
forces maintain wage—costs, obliterates profit; and the
attempt to reduce non—contractual incomes, without the
power to abate contractual incomes immediately,
jeopardises, both nationally and internationally, the
sanctity of contract ——MacMillanReport, pages 115—llb.
Whatever the explicitly acknowledged motivations for
Britain's return to gold after the First World War at the prewar
parity, it is surely doubtful that Britain could have mobilized
the resources that she needed to survive the Second World war it
she had repudiated her World War I debts. Indeed, it seems only
just that Churchill, as Britain's World War II leader, was able to
benefit from his own prescient deflationary policies ot twenty
years before. Keynes himself, of course, opposed the post—World—
War—I deflation for Keynesian reasons that foreshadow the post—
World—War—Il experience, to which we shall soon turn.— 10—
Turningto the United States after the Civil War, it is
harder to argue that concern about tinancing the next major war
was an important motivation for deflationary policies. The issue
of preservation of the Union had been settled and tuture
involvement in a major foreign war surely would not seem to have
been a relevant possibility. Nevertheless, in his inaugural
address of 1869, President Grant endorsed in the following terms
the Public Credit Act that the Congress had already passed:
A great debt has been contracted in securing to us and
our posterity the Union. The payment of this, principal
and interest, as well as the return to a specie basis as
soon as it can be accomplished without material detriment
to the debtor class or to the country at large, must be
provided for. To protect the national honor, every
dollar of Government indebtedness should be paid in gold,
unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract ——
quotedin Richardson (1903), page 7.
We can interpret Grant's desire •'to protect the national honor" as
reflecting strategic reputational considerations, although this
phrase also could have been a rhetorical cover tor other
(presumably distributional) objectives.
The British public debt traditionally consisted to a
relatively large extent of long—term bonds, including bonds with
no fixed maturity. Accordingly, British policy seems to have
viewed the typical debt holder as an annuitant with the associated
priority of maintaining the real value of the stream of interest
payments. American public debt, in contrast, usually has been
weighted towards shorter maturities. Moreover, during both World
Wars, the Federal Reserve System policy of pegging interest rates
encouraged the public to view government securities as liquid
assets.(The Bank of England also put a floor under government
bond prices during World War II.) The Federal Reserve even
offered a preferential discount rate for advances to member banks
on the collateral of government securities. Thus, when the
Federal Reserve immediately after World War I expressed its— 11—
concernwith protecting the value of government securities, this
objective initially took the form of a desire to control credit
expansion by methods that would not involve increased interest
rates. But as inflation continued into 1920, the conflict
intensified between maintaining the nominal market price of notes
and bonds and maintaining the real value of their interest
payments. Finally, the Federal Reserve allowed the temporary
increase in interest rates arid decline in security prices
necessary to reverse the postwar inflation.
In the decade after World War I as a whole, as in the decade
after the Civil War, American monetary policy had a distinctly
deflationary bias, with the Federal Reserve actively sterilizing
gold inflows and guarding against "speculativeexcesses". This
policy also kept inflationary expectations in check and nominal
interest rates low, thereby protecting the real value of both the
principal and interest payments on the war debt. Again, as in tne
Civil War case, the public record does not make clear the extent
to which policy reflected strategic reputational considerations.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that after World War I, Americans,
whether internationalists or isolationists, clearly feared that
World War I had been only the beginning of American involvementin
international conflict. The internationalists' response was to
try to reduce the possibility of further conflict,whereas the
isolationists' response was to try to reduce the possibility of
American involvement it. Neither strategy was certain of success,
making the possible need to finance another major war a relevant
policy consideration.
American monetary policy during the 192U's was not as
deflationary as British monetary policy. But, between 1929 and
1933, the price level in the United States declined
dramatically. Already by early 1932, the prevailing view, which
was reflected in Congressional pressure tor open—market purchases,
was that the American deflation, like the earlier British
deflation, had gone too far. These experiences, the more so— 12—
becausethey were associated with economic stagnation in the
United Kingdom and a depression in the United States, were among
the factors that influenced monetary policy after World War II.
2.After World War II
Monetary policy since World War II in both the USA arid the UK
has been not deflationary but persistently inflationary.[n both
countries, the price level rose in every year of the tirst two
postwar decades and by 1965 was almost twice its 1946 level in the
USA and more than twice its 1946 level in the UK. As one
consequence of this inflation, realized real rates of return on
debts incurred to finance World War II were negative. See the
lower section of Table 2.Since 1965 inflation has been even
higher in both the US and UK.In 1987 the American price level
was about five times its 1946 level and the British price level
was about fifteen times its 1946 level. In contrast to the
earlier postwar decreases in the debt to GNP ratio, the dramatic
post—World—War—Il decreases in this ratio shown in Figures 1 and 2
are attributable mainly to inflation, with the effects of net
increases in the nominal stock of debt and ot real economic growth
approximately offsetting each other.
The discussion that follows explores possible reasons tor
this unusual peacetime inflation. Specifically, we ask the
following question: Assuming that the desire to maintain a
trustworthy reputation for honoring war debts was an important
factor in inducing deflationary postwar monetary policies betore
World War II, why did this policy objective not serve to induce
either a deflationary monetary policy or the honoring in full of
war debts following World War II?
Of course, the difference in post—World—War—ILmonetary
policy, although quantitatively sharp, is one of degree not of
kind. Most importantly, although realized real rates ofreturn on
World—War—IL debts were slightly negative, and apparently less— 13—
thanwhat lenders expected, these debts were not repudiated.
Moreover, although monetary policy was not deflationary after
World War II, the objective of honoring war debts nevertheless
seems to have been a somewhat constraining influence on inflation,
at least until the mid—sixties by when the representative World—
War—Il loan had been redeemed.4
After World War II, as after World War I, the Federal
Reserve's concern about the value of government securities
initially caused it to focus on supporting bond prices. Stein
(1984, page 82) reports that "President Truman remembered that
when he came home from World War I the Liberty Bonds that he and
other soldiers owned declined sharply in value. He did not want
that to happen again." But, when serious inflationary tears
developed on the outbreak of the Korean War, the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury agreed in their famous accord that monetary
policy should focus on controlling bank reserves. The rationale
offered for this policy change is instructive and makes clear that
a primary policy objective was to maintain the credit of the
United States.
Early in February, 1951, there was a three—day meeting of
the Open Market Committee devoted almost exclusively to
what the Federal Reserve should do with increasing
inflationary pressures and strong opposition to any
modification of the support policy. The Committee
approved a letter to the President explaining its
position. The letter made four main points.
First, the System should do all in its power to
preserve the purchasing power of the dollar because any
policywhich eats away the dollar's purchasing power
would undermine confidence in the credit of the united
4The increase in inflation that began in the late sixties and
continued through the seventies is beyond the focus of the
present discussion. In the US pressure for monetary policy to
create or to accommodate higher inflation during this period
apparently resulted from the financing of the war in Vietnamand
from major disturbances in the world oil market. Unperceived
increases in natural unemployment rates also seem to have played
an important role in inducing inflationary policies in boththe
US and the UK.— 14—
Statesand the public's willingness to buy and hold
Government securities ——Anderson(l9b5, page 1U7).
What we are looking for then are reasons for why, although
reputational considerations remained relevant, inflationary
influences were relatively more important after World War II than
they were after other wars, with the unprecedented consequence of
negative realized real rates of return on World—War—Il debts.
As noted above, conflict over the distribution of claims to
national wealth and income is always an important factor in the
determination of economic policy. Before World War II in the UK
and USA, the political resolution of conflicting distributional
interests apparently did not rule Out postwar deflation. Those
people whose wealth or income decreased as a result of deflation
——primarilydebtors, including the taxpayers, who had to pay tor
ervicing the war debts, but also suppliers of labor services and
profit recipients, to the extent that deflationary monetary policy
depressed aggregate economic activity ——eitherviewed the ettects
of deflation as an acceptable cost to pay for maintaining a
trustworthy reputation for honoring war debts or were too
politically weak relative to the rentiers to prevent deflationary
policies. After World War II, some of the conditions that enabled
the political process to produce a policy of honoring war debts in
full clearly had changed.
Bytheend of World War II,twoclosely related political
developments, the extension of the franchise and the emergence of
organized labor as an effective economic and political force,
apparently had transformed the bias of monetary policy from
deflation to inflation. The political weakening of the rentiers
associated with these developments meant that direct
distributional consequences now weighed in the political process
more heavily against deflation. Perhaps more importantly, whereas
before World War II expressions of concern about the ettects of
deflationary monetary policy on aggregate employment were put
aside, the increased political strength of suppliers of labor— 15—
servicesafter World War II ruled out any policy that would
increase the risk, already assumed to be large, of a return to the
mass unemployment of the interwar period. Moreover, the
admittedly excessive interwar deflation, and the resulting
interwar prosperity of the rentiers in the midst of widespread
economic hardship, made it hard to defend again the view that
monetary policy should err on the side of preventing intlation.
As noted above, Keynes' argument against the post—World—Iar—l
deflation foreshadowed this change in priorities, but not until
the end of World War II were political conditions conducive to
codification of the Keynesian revolution in economic policy ——
thatis, to the explicit adoption ot high levels ot aggregate
employment and aggregate economic activity as policy goals, with
the attendant inflationary bias of monetary policy. Another
effect of these changed political conditions was the demise at
political support for the gold standard as an obstacle to
inflation.
Even with inflation developing after World War II as it did,
it would have been possible to honor the World—War--LI debts in
full by compensating debt holders for the effects of inflation.
Perhaps the most important obstacle to such a policy was the large
postwar demands on national resources with which servicing of war
debts had to compete. Both the United Kingdom and the United
States faced unprecedented costs of postwar reconstruction. Great
Britain had to rebuild its urban fabric, the housing, factories,
and public buildings that wartime bombing had destroyed. The
United States assumed the duty of assisting in the economic
recovery of all of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan, moreover,
was only one aspect of America's acceptance of responsibility tar
defending the Free World. The Cold War also involved the economic
support of a network of military alliances and of large and modern
armed forces and the willingness to use these forces, first in
Korea and later in Viet Nam.— 16—
Inaddition, during World War II the governments in both the
United Kingdom and the United States had promised broad postwar
rewards in exchange for maximum cooperation in the war ettort, and
the increased economic and political power ot organized labor
helped to enforce these promises.
Men talked of reconstruction as they had done during the
first World war. This time they were determined not to
be cheated, and therefore demanded the formulation of
practical schemes while the war was on.
This demand was hard to resist. The governing
classes were on their best behaviour, from conviction as
well as from calculation ——Taylor(1965, page 567).
ifl 1943 the Churchill government, facing a wave of strikes, a
revolt by Labour Members of Parliament, and by—election wins by
the radical Commonwealth Party, adopted the Beveridge plan for
universal social security. In his account of the Beveridge
Report, Harris (1975, page 247) refers not only to "the desire to
win and to keep the support of organized labor as a prerequisite
of maintaining the war effort and ultimately of winning the war,"
but also to "the need to foster morale in the armed torces."
Hicks (1954, page 202), in her discussion ot british dett
management in the immediate postwar years, emphasizes the
budgetary strains resulting not only from "a large upsurge in
social expenditure," but also from "a steadily mounting bill tor
food subsidies." Besides competing directly for the resources
that could be used to service war debts, the demands of
reconstruction, the Cold War, and the welfare state also
reinforced aversion to deflationary monetary policy, because it
might depress aggregate economic activity and tax revenues.
Another relevant factor was the size of the World—War--Il
debt. For the United States, previous peaks in the ratio of
public debt to annual GNP associated with the Civil War and World
War I were about 0.25 and 0.3. At the end of World War II, the
ratio reached 1.1. For the United Kingdom, previous peaks in the— 17—
ratioassociated with the Napoleanic Wars and World War I were
about 1.75. At the end of World War II, the ratio reached 2.5.
These larger war debts meant that after World War II the costs of
debt servicing had to be born more broadly, not as before mainly
by taxes on propertied people, and, accordingly, that a policy of
honoring war debts in full would have required political support
from new taxpayers who did not have as stron a vested interest in
secure property rights.
Another difference since 1945 that might seem to be relevant
is military technology, especially the invention ot nuclear
weapons. By the early fifties, military planners had recognizeu
that nuclear weapons had made obsolete the war of attrition, in
which, as in the Napoleanic Wars, American Civil War, and Worth
Wars I and II, the victor is the side that can mobilize the most
resources for the longest period. Accordingly, in their
influential book, Hitch & McKean (1960, page 15) stressed that
"the superior economic war potential of the United States is
important only to the extent that it has been effectively diverted
to security purposes before war starts." But, as Hitch &McKean
also recognized, "preparation for and deterrence of thermonuclear
war" now has the highest priority. It would be disastrous for our
ability to deter attack to be even temporarily ineffective.
Moreover, unexpectedly rapid technological developments could
easily mean that maintaining an effective deterrent from time to
time, as in the 1980's, would require temporary large military
expenditures, which would be financed efficiently by borrowing.
Thus, the invention of nuclear weapons probably has not reduced
the value of being able to issue large amounts of debt and the
associated value of a trustworthy reputation for honoring past
debts.— 18—
3. Excusable Default
Although realized real rates of return on World—War—Il debts
were negative, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States
seems to have lost its trustworthy reputation tor honoring its
debts. Both governments have been able to refinance old debts arid
to issue new debts, and the United States in particular has been
able to increase its debt to GNP ratio during the 1980's in order
to finance a large investment in military hardware.
The evidence also strongly suggests that lenders did not
anticipate the iegative real rates of return on World—War—Il
debts. This evidence takes two forms: First, the concensus of
contemporary commentators was that the main postwar problem would
be deflation and depression.
Almost certainly the most widely—held expectation at
the time was that prices would go down after the war -— ifthis expectation seems unreasonable to us, it is
only by hindsight. Memory of the sharp price decline
after World War I was reinforced by the climate of
opinion formed by the depressed 1930's and both were
further strengthened by much—publicized predictions ot
"experts" that war's end would be followed by a major
economic collapse ——Friedman& Schwartz (19t3, page
560).
Second, although interest rates on bonds did not rise above 2.5
percentuntil the accord, calculations by Murphy (1950) imply
that private nonbank lenders ot only financed more than one—halt
of the consolidated deficit of the federal government for tiscal
years 1941 through 1945, but that they also increased their
holdings of public debt in the immediate postwar years, even
though they were no longer either constrained by wartime
shortages or subject to patriotic exhortations. Thus, it seems
clear that the inflation in the United Kingdom and the United
States after World War II resulted in a partial default on World—
War—Il debts. Realized real rates of return were not only
negative, but also surely less than lenders expected.— 19—
Inthe theoretical analysis of Grossman & Van Ffuyck
(September 1988, December 1988), sovereign detaults occur as bad
outcomes of debt servicing obligations that are implicitly
contingent on the realized state of the world. The
interpretation of sovereign debts as contingent claims implies
that sovereign debts serve at least in part to shift to lenders
risks associated with verifiable events that affect the fortunes
of the sovereign. This interpretation of sovereign debts also
implies that lenders sharply differentiate excusable detaults,
which are justifiably associated with implicitly understood
contingencies, from debt repudiation, which would be
unjustifiable and inexcusable. Being consistent with lenders'
expectations about state—contingent debt servicing, excusable
default does not preclude continued access to loans.
This theory explains why the partial detaults on World—war-
II debts did not result in a loss of reputation. Lenders
apparently understood that the obligation to service these debts
was contingent on postwar events. The competing claims on
national resources that materialized after World War II ——
especiallythe costs of postwar reconstruction, the welfare
state, and the Cold War ——wereunforeseeable, but verifiable,
contingencies that made partial default excusable.
4.Summary
This paper has analyzed the response of postwar monetary
policies in the United Kingdom and the United States to the
conflicting pressures resulting from the pervasive objective of
maintaining a trustworthy reputation for honoring war debts and
from the other demands on national resources with which the
servicing of war debts has had to compete. The paper argued that
before World War II reputational considerations were an important
factor in inducing deflationary postwar monetary policies. The— 20—
paperthen asked why this policy objective did not induce either
a deflationary monetary policy or the honoring in full of war
debts following World War El. The discussion focused on
differences in economic and political conditions after World War
II, especially the extension of the voting franchise, the
increased economic and political power of organized labor, and,
perhaps most importantly, the large postwar demands on national
resources with which the servicing of World—War—Il debts had to
compete. Finally, the analysis argued that, because these
postwar developments were unforeseeable, but verifiable,
contingencies, the partial default on World—War—Il debts was
excusable and, accordingly, did not cause either the United
Kingdom or the United States to lose its trustworthy reputation.— 21—
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